Can an Arbitrator Award Back Pay for Religious Bias?

By April 10, 2026October 19th, 2026Discrimination & Civil Rights

Yes. In April 2026 the Appeals Court reinstated an arbitrator’s award of back pay, benefits and seniority to a state worker whose religious exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate was denied without a real look at accommodations. The court held that even if the employer had a “nondelegable” management right over staffing, it had to give way because the grievance involved religious discrimination. This is an unpublished Appeals Court decision under Rule 23.0, which courts may cite as persuasive but not as binding precedent.

What happened

The employee worked at the state transportation department’s Highway Operations Center, which runs around the clock. In 2021 the Governor ordered executive department employees to show proof of COVID-19 vaccination or obtain an exemption where a reasonable accommodation could be reached. The employee asked for a religious exemption and supplied a letter from his pastor. The department accepted that his beliefs were sincere, but its interview covered only those beliefs, not possible accommodations. It denied the request as an undue hardship. The employee appealed and proposed remote work, regular testing, distancing, or working in a separate space, but the department denied the appeal and fired him in December 2021. It offered to reinstate him in October 2022, and he went back to work. His union kept pressing for lost pay and seniority through arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement, which barred discrimination based on religion or creed.

What the court decided

The arbitrator found that the department had not met its burden to show it properly considered accommodations. Its review of reassignment, remote work and a separate workspace was “cursory,” and its conclusions rested on conclusory testimony. He awarded back pay, benefits and seniority credit. The department asked the Superior Court to vacate the award under G.L. c. 150C, § 11. The judge agreed, ruling that staffing decisions during the pandemic were a nondelegable power under the department’s enabling statute, G.L. c. 6C, § 3 (6).

The Appeals Court reversed and ordered the award confirmed in Massachusetts Department of Transportation v. United Steelworkers, Local 5696, No. 25-P-123 (Mass. App. Ct. April 10, 2026) (Rule 23.0 decision).

Courts give arbitrators great deference and are bound by their findings, even ones that look wrong. Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54 (2001). Whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority remains open to review. The court did not decide whether the department actually had a nondelegable staffing right. It held that even if it did, that doctrine yields to prohibitions on invidious discrimination. Blue Hills Regional Dist. Sch. Comm. v. Flight, 383 Mass. 642 (1981); Framingham v. Framingham Police Officers Union, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 537 (2018). In Flight, the Supreme Judicial Court explained that an arbitrator deciding a discrimination claim intrudes no more than an independent commission would.

That reasoning fit here. The Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination could have ordered the same relief, since G.L. c. 151B, § 5 lets it order reinstatement with or without back pay. Stonehill College v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 441 Mass. 549 (2004). The department argued the Flight exception had been narrowed. The court disagreed: the later cases only refused to extend it to claims based on union membership, which is not constitutionally protected. Department of State Police v. Massachusetts Org. of State Eng’rs & Scientists, 456 Mass. 450 (2010). Religious discrimination is barred by both the First Amendment and the Massachusetts Constitution, so the claim fell within the exception.

What this means for you

If you work for a public employer under a union contract, a grievance about religious discrimination can go to binding arbitration, and the employer cannot easily escape the result by calling its decision a protected management right. Flight itself applied the same rule to a promotion denied because of sex.

The case also shows how an employer’s accommodation process can fail. A sincere belief was not the end of the process. The arbitrator faulted the employer for not actually looking at options, such as vacant positions, remote work, or a separate workspace, and the court was bound by that finding. Saying “nothing was available” without evidence did not hold up.

Not every worker has a union contract or arbitration. Many workers bring religious discrimination claims through the MCAD or in court under G.L. c. 151B instead, and those routes have their own deadlines.

What to do now

  1. Put any accommodation request in writing and keep a copy of everything you submit.
  2. Propose specific accommodations yourself, as this employee did on appeal.
  3. Write down what the employer asked you and whether anyone discussed options with you.
  4. If you are in a union, tell your steward right away and ask that a grievance be filed within the contract’s deadline.
  5. Talk to an employment lawyer about MCAD and court deadlines, which can run at the same time as a grievance.

If this is your situation, call Doubleday Law at (617) 575-2006 or tell us what happened. Deadlines for discrimination and employment claims can be short.

Talk to a Massachusetts tenant lawyer

Every situation is different. If you are dealing with a problem like the one in this article, call Doubleday Law for a consultation. Many tenant claims carry short deadlines, so it pays to act early.

Call (617) 575-2006 Or contact us online

This article is general information, not legal advice. Laws change, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Arthur Hardy-Doubleday

Author Arthur Hardy-Doubleday

Arthur Hardy-Doubleday is a Massachusetts attorney representing tenants in Housing Court across the state. His practice covers eviction defense, housing discrimination and civil rights, employment discrimination, commercial tenant defense and appeals. Admitted 2012. Prevailed at the Supreme Judicial Court in Davis v. Comerford. Former president of the NAACP Martha's Vineyard Branch. Suffolk University JD/MBA, Trinity College.

More posts by Arthur Hardy-Doubleday

Leave a Reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

Share
Call Now Button